Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry signed a memorandum of understanding on August 17 with the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) to cooperate on the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The agreement was signed in Beijing by Permanent Secretary Augustin Lee and CAEA Vice Chairman Liu Jing, in the presence of Minister Dr Tan See Leng and CAEA Chairman Shan Zhongde.
The MOU covers a broad range of technical areas: reactor technology safety assessments, personnel training, scientific exchanges, public communication, nuclear safeguards, and civilian applications of atomic technology. Singapore has not yet made a definitive decision on adopting nuclear energy, but the underlying rationale is clear: build the expertise before it’s needed, not after. Minister Tan put it plainly — “we are laying these foundations, one agreement at a time.”
This deal with Beijing fits into a deliberate strategy of diversifying sources of knowledge. The Ministry of Trade clarified that the agreement with China complements existing arrangements with France, South Korea, and the United States. The framework with Washington is particularly robust: a “123 Agreement” for civilian nuclear cooperation entered into force in December 2024, opening the door to the sharing of advanced technology, including small modular reactors. This was followed by a Memorandum on strategic nuclear cooperation signed in January 2025, along with specific agreements between the Energy Market Authority and two leading American research institutions — Idaho National Laboratory and the Battelle Memorial Institute — aimed at strengthening local technical capabilities.
The domestic context is pushing in the same direction. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, in his 2025 Budget Statement, announced that the government would explore the potential use of nuclear power for electricity generation, with concrete steps to develop independent assessment capacity. Singapore is also preparing for an IAEA review — the so-called Phase 1 INIR mission — scheduled for 2027, which evaluates a country’s infrastructure readiness for nuclear adoption. Having signed agreements with multiple international partners is part of that preparation.
What emerges from the overall picture is a deliberate exercise in geopolitical pragmatism. Singapore is engaging China and the United States simultaneously, without aligning with either camp, and instead accumulating knowledge from multiple technological traditions. The Chinese and American nuclear supply chains differ substantially — in reactor types, regulatory standards, and industrial heritage. Access to both gives Singapore a broader vantage point from which to decide, when the time comes, which path to take. And given the pace of agreements signed over the past twelve months, that moment may be closer than it appears.
